Introduction
Over the past decade, my research has focused on the implications of globalization for health disparities. Definitional controversies persist as they will in the academic world, but the description of globalization as a 'pattern of transnational economic integration animated by the ideal of creating self-regulating global markets for goods, services, capital, technology, and skills' (Eyoh and Sandbrook 2003, 252) suffices here. Although this definition refers to 'self-regulating' markets, these 146 class struggle as the only resolution to urban problems'. She claims that '[b] y studying situated phenomena through a lens that understands them as singular moments in a unified and integrated global process, analysts lose sight of complex urban situations as particular engagements with the global' (Ong 2011, 2) . Now, the Marxist models she describes in stylized form are something of a caricature, at least as such models are deployed by serious social scientists. The point is important because much analytical clarity, and many opportunities for engagement and resistance, can be lost if we neglect the common origins of numerous metropolitan situations in a 'unified and integrated global process'. For example, an important analysis pointed out that contests over the occupation and development of metropolitan space in countries rich and poor alike reflect an economic dynamic in which 'the prime resources of the city are increasingly appropriated by the affluent. And globalization is inflationary as the new rich are able to pay more for a range of key goods, especially land' (United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2003, 52) . Another illustration of the value of a focus on political economy, discussed further below, is provided by the concept of labour arbitrage -adopted from a trade journal by Ong (2006, 161) herself to describe, with remarkable succinctness and clarity, a key driver of global reorganizations of production.
The second part of my core argument is captured by political sociologist William Robinson (2002) , a leader of the emerging transdiscipline of critical globalization studies (see Appelbaum and Robinson 2005) , in his insistence that development now must be understood with reference to 'social' rather than 'territorial cartographies'. These are defined by the relations of people living within a specific set of political boundaries, and often in close proximity, to 'new globalised circuits' of production and capital accumulation (Robinson 2002 (Robinson , 1060 . Urbanist Saskia Sassen (2012, 323-329) similarly argues the need for a new geography of centres and margins. Whatever the chosen terminology, this perspective expands the first part of my argument with more specific reference to the conditions of life and work that affect health, and is elaborated upon in the sections of the article that follow.
I first describe global (or at least transnational) reorganizations of production and finance that are now rather familiar. In cartography, 'isolines' connect points of equal value on a map, such as points of equal elevation on contour maps or barometric pressure on weather maps. In the twenty-first century, it is useful to think in terms of literal and metaphorical maps in which isolines connect individuals, households, and communities based on the terms -analogous to the terms of trade between countries -on which they are connected (or not) to global flows and transactions. Those isolines may cross multiple national borders, even as they define and describe a particular set of opportunity structures that are only loosely, if at all, dependent on national location. I then describe a number of cross-border 'emerging markets', 2 including the competition for metropolitan space, which are relevant to health and its social determinants. I conclude with three propositions about how the social science of health disparities should respond to globalization, in a way that I hope will encourage reflection on conceptual synergies and transdisciplinary topical collaborations between anthropology and political economy.
Global reorganization of production transforms labour markets
A key driver of, and motivation for, global reorganization of production is labour arbitrage: 'the ability to pay one labor pool less than another labor pool for accomplishing the same work, typically by substituting labor in one geography for labor in a different locale' (trade journal article quoted in Ong 2006, 161; see also Roach 2006) . This is by now a relatively familiar story, since documentation of a new international division of labour dates from the late 1970s (Fröbel et al. 1980; Vaughan 1978 made by workers at risk of dying when they are locked into factories, but a century later the factories and the fires are half a world away in locations like Bangladesh, which is now (after China) the world's second-largest exporter of clothing (Brooks 2007, 85; Yardley 2012) . In one recent case US retailer Wal-Mart, a major customer of a factory where more than a hundred workers died in a fire, had apparently resisted initiatives to improve worker safety because of their cost (Greenhouse 2012);  it was able to do this because of the market power it exercises over suppliers from its position at the top of commodity chains that cross multiple national borders. Indeed, the operations of Wal-Mart perhaps more than those of any other single firm illustrate how globalization 'connects sales clerks in Bentonville to truck drivers at the U.S.-Mexico border and line workers in Guangdong' (Gereffi and Christian 2009, 580-81 ; see also Bair and Bernstein 2006; Vidal 2012) , with far-reaching consequences for work conditions and living standards.
Such restructuring of labour markets and associated economic opportunities is central to Robinson's call for studies of development to transition from territorial to social cartographies. He writes: 'A global division of labour suggests differential participation in global production according to social standing and not necessarily geographic location, and accounts for sweatshops in East Los Angeles and Northern Honduras, as well as gated communities in Hollywood and São Paulo. Social order is increasingly organised globally, not nationally' (Robinson 2002 (Robinson , 1067 . Thus, globalization has increased the incomes of the richest one percent of the world's population, but also of those in the middle strata of China's income distribution, while generating 'stagnation of incomes among the poor people or lower middle classes in rich countries' (Milanovic 2014, 80 Like the opportunities for labour arbitrage presented by offshoring, the domestic availability of this population arguably depresses the wages of a substantial portion of the documented workforce and limits the prospects for collective action.
Living conditions as well as working conditions can be stereotypically third world. An interviewbased study of undocumented Mexican immigrants living in New York City, which in many respects constituted a reprise of a New York Times series published more than a decade earlier (Alvarez 1996; Bruni 1996; Bruni and Sontag 1996; Sontag 1996) , described a 'basement shared by eighteen single men, an unheated garage that is home to two Mexican families, an abandoned tractor trailer … and an abandoned tugboat and barge, both vessels half in and half out of the water, and each providing housing to another two or three men' (Hellman 2008, 159) . Instead of thinking in terms of national labour markets, it is more useful to think in terms of nonterritorial divisions among integrated, precarious, and excluded forms of employment (Cox 1999 ) that exist in countries rich and poor alike, with important consequences for disparities in health status. The recent tendency of some firms to return work to high-income countries, or to territories closer to them (Booth 2013) , as labour costs rise (because of localized shortages rather than collective action, which often remains hazardous to those involved) and as the difficulties of long-distance management become apparent, actually underscores this point by reflecting the locational flexibility and fluidity of contemporary production against the background of downward wage pressure in the high-income world. In the words of a prescient Economist survey that appeared before the 2008 financial crisis, 'the usual argument in favour of globalisation -that it will make most workers better off, with only a few lowskilled ones losing out -has not so far been borne out by the facts. Most workers are being squeezed' (Woodall 2006, 6) .
Finance and new contours of marginalization
Since the start of the 1980s, financial markets as well as production have been reorganized across borders as a consequence of four interacting processes. First, because of advances in information processing and telecommunications, vast sums of money can be moved around the world almost instantaneously. Second, the United States and the United Kingdom competed to deregulate the domestic and overseas activities of their financial services industries (Girón and Correa 2002; Helleiner 1994 ). These two processes were essential to a third trend, which has been characterized as financialization: 'a pattern of accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production' (Krippner 2005, 174) .
Fourth, by the start of the 1980s the precarious state of many LMIC economies threatened the financial health of the institutions that had lent heavily to them (Makin 1984 (1994) (1995) , south Asia (1997 -1998 ), and Russia (1998 , where the resulting economic devastation exposed millions of people to poverty and economic insecurity. In the aftermath of the Mexican financial crisis, the managing director of the IMF at the time noted the importance of 'market perceptions: whether the country's policies are deemed basically sound and its economic future, promising', conceding (or perhaps threatening) that 'shifts in the market's perception of these underlying fundamentals can be quite swift, brutal, and destabilizing' (Camdessus 1995) .
Capital markets therefore have 'the power to discipline national governments. … These markets can now exercise the accountability functions associated with citizenship: they can vote governments' economic policies in or out, they can force governments to take certain measures and not others' (Sassen 2003, 70) . The financial crises that result from such exercises, which have become commonly follow financial crises transfer wealth from a broad segment of the population (the national tax base financing the bailout) to a minority of households with substantial deposits, debtors whose loans are subsequently forgiven, and financial institution shareholders (Halac and Schmukler 2004) . The small minority of the population owning mobile assets can take advantage of opportunities for capital flight, transferring assets abroad 'to evade domestic social control' in the form of taxation, regulation, or devaluation (Ndikumana and Boyce 1998, 199 (Barrionuevo 2012) . Finally, a recent study of seventeen high-income economies found that the 'fiscal consolidation' (austerity) that follows financial crises decreases the share of national income paid out in wages and salaries, while increasing that of capital, and increases long-term unemployment (Ball et al. 2013 ).
The financial crisis that spread across the world in 2008, as the collapse of the market for securitized, high-risk mortgages revealed 'underappreciated, but potent, interconnections between firms in the global financial system' (Bank of England 2008, 9) , further transformed the social cartography of a financially globalized world. Financial institutions in the United States (especially) and the United Kingdom had aggressively fought back against domestic regulation in order to create new financial products that extracted resources from working-class households (Immergluck 2011; Sassen 2009 ). When the markets for these products collapsed, trillions of dollars in cash and credit guarantees were mobilized to bail out financial institutions (Bank of England 2009) , while the costs were borne first and worst by people who had no role in precipitating the crisis and no control over its outcome. In LMICs, the initial response of social protection systems was described as 'limited'
and inadequately directed toward the most vulnerable (McCord 2010), and a 2011 UNICEF review found that after an initial period of expansionary fiscal policy many LMICs were considering such austerity measures as limiting or rolling back wages for teachers and health workers, retrenching existing social protection transfers, and increasing consumption taxes on basic goods like food (Ortiz et al. 2011a ).
3 Individuals with more than US$1 million in liquid, investable, financial assets.
Elsewhere, the combination of reduced government revenues with heavy borrowing to finance stimulus spending contributed to subsequent sovereign debt crises that as of mid-2012 threatened several Eurozone economies; for some high-income countries, the accumulation of debt is likely to create long-term fiscal policy constraints that limit the space for social protection (Schäfer and Streeck 2013) . By early 2012, officially reported unemployment had risen to 14 percent in Ireland, the former Celtic Tiger, and to more than 20 percent in Spain (50 percent among people under 25), where foreclosures and the anticipated costs of bank bailouts were rising in parallel (Tremlett 2012 ).
In the United Kingdom, a combination of high unemployment and (selective) post-crisis austerity programs undermined the nutritional status of many on low incomes and threatened their access to housing, at a time when health disparities between rich and poor were on many measures already as Detroit, which saw a decline but only a slight one (Capgemini 2012) . In short, the financial crisis magnified the ratcheting-up of intranational economic inequality associated with the cross-border reorganization of production and finance. As the editor of Le Monde Diplomatique has written: 'The inequality machine is reshaping the whole planet' (Halimi 2013) .
'Emerging markets' of a different kind
The operations of the inequality machine juxtapose spreading economic insecurity with accumulations of wealth that isolate their owners from reliance on all but the most basic institutions of collective or social provision, and sometimes even from those. Such juxtapositions are especially visible in so-called world cities, where the command and control functions of the global economy
Changing cartographies 154 generate a parallel demand for legions of low-wage service workers who clean the buildings, drive the taxis, cook and deliver the restaurant meals, and often provide child care (see, for example, AbuLughod 1999, 285-320; Sassen 2012, 241-272) ; exploiting the workers who provide these services can in turn offer new opportunities for capital accumulation, for example in contracted-out service provision (Winerip 1998) . The inequality machine is also associated with multiple cross-border markets in which the rich now outbid others for resources of various kinds or take advantage of opportunities presented by differences in income and wealth.
Gentrification
The first of these emerging markets involves contests over urban or metropolitan space: gentrification, broadly defined (Sassen 1991, 255; Slater 2011) . We associate gentrification in the first instance with high-income cities, but it has now spread to numerous LMIC metropolitan areas, where the largest-scale variants are referred to by one author as 'megagentrification' (Lees 2012 The increased wealth of the winners from globalization, those well placed for a variety of reasons to benefit from new economic opportunities, has led to the emergence of real estate investment and provision of associated infrastructure and financing as a major theatre of capital accumulation for both domestic and transnational investors outside the high-income world, where it had earlier become well established. In cities as diverse as Accra, Beirut, Santiago, Johannesburg, and Bangalore, the prospect of real estate profits has attracted capital to residential and commercial projects oriented toward corporate clients and rich individuals (Goldman 2011; Grant and Yang 2009, 18-89; López-Morales 2010; Makdisi 1997; Murray 2008, 191-209) . Of special note are the profits to be made in many metropolitan areas from major entertainment and sporting mega-events such as the Olympic Games and Grand Prix auto races, which can be highly profitable (Lefebvre and Roult 2011; Schausteck de Almeida et al. 2013; Scherer 2011) . Along with certain kinds of infrastructure and amenities associated with such events or oriented to the needs of the rich, such spectacles are viewed, or at least justified for public consumption and for purposes of legitimizing public subsidies, as broadly beneficial because they brand a city as a world-class location suitable for foreign investment and attracting wealthy tourists.
Health workers and health care
Another emerging market involves the mirror-image processes of health worker migration, to either higher income countries or the well-financed private sector within their own countries, and medical tourism, or the purchase of health care outside one's own country. 
Organ trade and clinical research
Related to medical tourism is the market for human organs -the topic of urban legends, but now Four points about land grabs are especially important. First, many land grabs are also not only about land, but also about the accompanying access to water resources (Mehta et al. eds. 2012; Rulli et al. 2013 ); this implies an expansion of a 'virtual water trade' Tamea et al. 2013 ) that is already quite substantial. Second, whether as a reflection of 'unwavering faith in the role of foreign investment in national economic development' (German et al. 2011, 2) Governments of many non-Northern countries (including China, South Africa, and several countries in the Middle East) or companies based in those countries are actively involved in land acquisitions; companies based in Brazil and India, among other countries, are originating acquisitions while at the same time land in those countries is being acquired by foreign actors. 5 Fourth, and most fundamentally, the underlying political dynamic is one of 'wide-ranging global "land reform" -in this case, a regressive land reform where governments take land from the poor and give (or sell or lease) it to the rich' (White et al. 2012, 620) . The irony is especially bitter for those old enough to remember earlier prescriptions for land reform as a partial remedy for catastrophic levels of domestic inequality in economies where agricultural production still supported a substantial proportion of the population and land ownership was highly concentrated.
Thoughts on research directions: Bringing class back in
The preceding observations suggest three more general propositions about the social science of health disparities and their underlying causes. First, at the risk of being repetitive, globalization restructures social relations in a way that breaks down familiar territorial divisions and rescales the politics of issues like the distribution of wealth and poverty and the locus of control over economic activity. Convergence of national per capita incomes, a result of the strong performance of a number of LMIC economies after the 2008 crisis, in many cases distracts attention from growing structural inequalities within national borders in access to the various prerequisites for leading a healthy life, and the local manifestations of those inequalities. Worldwide, it is estimated that circa 2008 roughly three-quarters of the world's poorest people (based on the World Bank's $1.25/day threshold of extreme poverty) lived in countries where per capita incomes were above the threshold conventionally used to define a low-income country (Sumner 2012) . In an extreme example, India's more than 400 million extremely poor people coexist with 153,000 high net-worth individuals (Capgemini and RBC Wealth Management 2013) , in a class structure described by Arundhati Roy (2012, n.p.): 'India's 100 richest people own assets equivalent to one-fourth of the GDP. … The 300 million of us who belong to the new, post-IMF "reforms" middle class -the market -live side by side with … the ghosts of 250,000 debt-ridden farmers who have killed themselves, and of the 800 million who have been impoverished and dispossessed to make way for us.' One cannot of course generalize from this example, and in some middle-income countries economic inequality has been declining, albeit from extremely high levels (Lustig et al. 2012) . Nevertheless, profound scepticism is 5 An interesting parallel can be drawn here with expansion into the high-income world, through acquisitions, by transnational corporations based in LMICs. Brazil's Vale S.A., which now owns large and historically important nickel mining operations in Canada, and India's Tata group, which now owns and markets the British automotive brands Jaguar and Land Rover, are cases in point.
in order about the ability of the rising tide of growth through integration into the global marketplace to lift all boats, even in countries where growth is rapid and sustained. This point has been conceded even by the World Bank with respect to the operation of labour markets (World Bank 2007, 67-100) .
This leads to a second point: class -in the Marxist sense 6 -as an analytical category remains relevant, even indispensable across multiple scales and contexts: 'Marxism would be abandoned at too high a cost, given the contribution of its method of abstraction to identifying the generative mechanisms and emergent causal powers associated with capital as a social relation and commodification, which can be viewed as the central articulating principle of the contemporary global political economy' (Ryner 2006, 63) . Jon Elster (1986), Leslie Sklair (2005) , and Erik Olin Wright (1985) , among others, working from diverse methodological starting points, show that classes are not abstractions isolated from individual agency, but (conversely) that agency does not operate in isolation from material situations. Contemporary globalization means that those situations are increasingly defined by economic processes that operate across multiple national borders. This holds whether we are discussing the owners and managers of financial assets whose portfolio choices collectively constitute the verdict of 'the markets'; gentrifying households and real estate capitalists who use a combination of private and state power to displace those who stand in the way of 'higher value uses' of urban locations; city dwellers who claim that the poor have 'infested everything' and favour 'a bottle of kerosene and a match' for the favelas; 7 subsistence producers who are displaced by land grabs; or the expanding proportion of the working class in high-income countries who are trapped in low-wage, insecure, service-sector jobs, going deeper into debt and facing long-term post-crisis unemployment and a gradual drift into unemployability, perhaps compounded by subprime loans and foreclosure (see, for example, Ehrenreich 2001; Hodson et al. 2014; Leicht and Fitzgerald 2014) . These idiosyncratically chosen examples suffice to show the 6 There are, of course, multiple Marxist definitions of class; the distinctions among them are outside the scope of this article, but they share a focus on the productive process and on property rights. Elster's (1986, 147) definition of a class as 'a group of people who by virtue of what they possess are compelled to engage in the same activities if they want to make the best use of their endowments' will suffice. The key point is that Marxist conceptions of class must be distinguished from conceptions of class rooted in the work of theorists like Pierre Bourdieu, which are 'linked … to the interplay between economic, social and cultural capital', as exemplified by the British Broadcasting Corporation's 'Great British Class Survey' (Savage et al. 2013 ).
7 These quotations are taken from a long interview with the wife of a Brazilian real estate agent that opens Teresa Caldeira's (2000) superb study of São Paulo, City of Walls.
degree of nuance that is compatible with Marxist conceptions of class, and indeed essential to their contemporary application to social scientific explanation. Political commitments and allegiances cannot be read off class position in a mechanistic way, but at the same time class position cannot be ignored in understanding those commitments and allegiances.
Third, the role of the state and of public policy must be (re)considered in light of these first two
propositions. Observations about the distinctive nature of the power of capital (or in some formulations business; see Lindblom 1977) are hardly new, but it cannot be emphasized too strongly that globalization fundamentally strengthens the position of capital because of the opportunities for exit (Hirschman 1970 ) associated with the reorganization of production across borders and the shift of power from governments to financial markets. The extent of the policy space that remains available to particular national governments is an ongoing debate in political science and international relations, and obviously depends on the policy context and the position of the country in question vis-à-vis other actors in the global environment. Importantly, the state and elites who are defined by their connection to state power have often advanced globalization, rather than simply responding to it, even at the cost of shrinking policy space. Sandra Halperin (2013, 224) states the point: 'The discourse of globalization emphasizes the necessity of governments to adapt to newness and difference, a necessity that forecloses choice. But government policies are designed, not to adapt to new circumstances, but to promote them.'
Alice Amsden (1990, 18) memorably argued that the 'discipline of labour by the state lies at the heart of all late industrialization'. Although that discipline remains an imperfect process, it is often used proactively to sustain low labour costs and flexible employment regimes that are attractive to foreign (Broudehoux 2013; Romero 2012; Saad-Filho and Morais 2014; Watts 2013) . This is far from a complete inventory of state strategies to facilitate and accelerate globalization -it leaves out, for example, the entire field of trade policy -but it is enough to make the point.
Here, again, an important analytical contribution comes from an anthropologist. In a discussion of Indian state policy with respect to large dam and urban transport projects funded by the World Bank, Shalini Randeria (2007; see also Randeria and Grunder 2011) offers the concept of 'cunning states' that 'lack the political will, rather than the space, for autonomous policy making' (Randeria 2007, 6) . Cunning in this case was deployed in order to limit accountability both to international institutions like the World Bank and to India's own citizens, while forced displacement, internal resettlement, and expropriation compensated at artificially low values continued. Randeria's failure, however, to connect state actions with specific class interests -in contrast (for example) to Goldman's (2011) exploration of high-end real estate developments and the construction of the requisite subsidised airports and highways in Bangalore -limits the value of her analysis despite its descriptive richness and the importance of the cunning state concept. In other words, cunning and the absence of political will that leads to its exercise represent a phenomenon that demands explanation (explanandum), rather than a source of explanations (explanans).
Post-crisis austerity programs foreground this point. The long-term arithmetic of failing to balance budgets and reduce sovereign debt cannot be ignored. At the same time many governments arguably retain considerable room to select among options for addressing deficits by way of expansionary vs.
contractionary fiscal policy, in other words, by raising revenues instead of reducing expenditures, and within the latter category choosing among expenditure reductions with different distributional impacts. In the past, cunning appears often to have been deployed as cover for the existing preference of state elites, as shown by archival research to have happened in the earlier case of British responses to the sterling crisis of 1976 (Rogers 2009) . Further research will be valuable in generating understandings of the politics of health inequalities by revealing the extent to which the financial crisis in effect provided valuable cover for the neoliberal project, cloaking it (and the associated negative health effects; see Marmot et al. 2013; Stuckler and Basu 2013) in an aura of inevitability. To understand how and why these choices are made, situationally specific alliances between state elites and particular classes, within the context provided by globalization, assume special importance.
Social scientists today tend to be sceptical about so-called grand narratives. Good reasons may exist for this scepticism, yet analytical approaches organized around class and class conflict can offer considerable explanatory power even in the absence of commitment to such narratives. The evidence presented here suggests that recognizing the common origins in macroscale social processes of various local situations that potentially destroy health is essential if the contemporary social science of health is to reflect the importance of the 'central engines' referred to by Diderichsen and colleagues (2001) , and to speak truth about their operation. The time is therefore ripe not only for more cross-fertilization between the work of anthropologists and those in other disciplines like political economy, but also for more formal transdisciplinary research collaborations that address the challenges to health in a globalizing world.
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